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> Priority Number 14(b) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the 
Supreme Court under Article VIII, Section 3, of the Utah 
Constitution; 78-2-2(3)(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended; and Rule 3, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
The Appeal of Nu-Trend is from an Order granting 
Deseret Federal's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's lien fore-
closure action. As to Respondent, that case involved the 
relative priority of its interest in and to certain real 
property located in Davis County, Utah, and that of the lien 
claimants. Other Defendants were voluntarily dismissed from 
the lawsuit by Plaintiff. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondent accepts Appellants1 Statement of the Issues 
with the following exceptions and additions: 
1. Were the trial court's Findings of Fact as to 
relation-back of the lien claimants1 work and material 
abandonment supported by substantial evidence and not 
clearly erroneous? 
2. May a lien claimant, for purposes of priority, 
relate back to work performed for a prior owner, particularly 
when they are on notice of an intervening purchase money 
Trust Deed? 
3. Have these Plaintiffs waived their rights by a 
failure to bid or enjoin the 1983 trustee's sale? 
4. Have these Plaintiffs been guilty of laches or 
estoppel by reason of their failure to prosecute this action 
for a period of approximately 4% years? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 38-1-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
is believed to be determinative of the issues presented 
above. 
The contents and provisions of the cited authority, are 
fully set forth in the Addendum to this Brief in accord with 
Rule 24(f), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By reason of Appellants1 failure to submit a Statement 
of the Case herein, Respondent represents the following: 
This appeal arises out of a lien foreclosure action 
initially filed by Nu-Trend Electric against Units 80 and 
81, Maple Hills Condominiums, in Davis County, Utah. (R. 
1-6) . Respondent Deseret Federal was joined as a party 
Defendant by reason of its interest in the property under a 
development loan made to Maple Hills Development, which 
encumbered the entire condominium project. (R. 48). Also 
joined as party Defendants were others claiming an interest 
in the subject units, including Franklin Johnson, the 
reputed owner. Appellants Croft Floors and Carter W. 
Bangerter Masonry ultimately intervened as party Plaintiffs 
in 1987. All Defendants, excepting Deseret Federal, were 
voluntarily dismissed from the lawsuit in order to allow 
prosecution of this Appeal. (R. 204). 
The lien foreclosure Complaint, as to Nu-Trend Electric, 
sought recovery for work performed at the units between 
September 1981 and May 1982. (R. 115). An amended lien was 
subsequently recorded by Nu-Trend in February of 1987 
seeking payment for work commencing in August 1985 and 
concluding in 1986. During that same period of time, 
Intervenors Croft Floors and Carter W. Bangerter Masonry 
also recorded liens representing work for which they were 
unpaid. (R. 87-88). Deseret Federal filed an Answer to 
the initial Complaint, generally denying the allegations and 
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affirmatively asserting priority over the mechanic's liens 
by reason of its construction loan to Maple Hills 
Development. 
A review of the Record indicates that little, if any, 
action took place respecting the case between December of 
1982 and May of 1985 when it was placed on the inactive 
calendar by the District Court Clerk. (R. 24-25). As will 
be developed in greater detail below, however, a number of 
important transactions took place as to Units 80 and 81. 
Responding to Deseret Federal's scheduling of a trust-
ee's sale on the property, in March of 1987 Plaintiffs filed 
their Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint, a Motion to 
Intervene as to Croft Floors and, importantly, a Motion to 
Stay the trustee's sale. (R. 32-40). In reply, Deseret 
Federal submitted a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint 
premised upon its senior and prior position, vis a vis the 
lien claimants, in the subject real property. Filed with 
the Motion was an Affidavit of Thomas C. Sturdy outlining 
the lender's prior foreclosure sale conducted in 1983 under 
the Maple Hills Development Trust Deed. (R. 61-83). 
A hearing was held on the various Motions by District 
Judge Cornaby on April 8, 1987, just six days prior to 
Deseret Federal's trustee's sale set for April 14. (R. 
There exists an unfortunate lapse in the Record at 
this point. Although Appellants filed a Motion to Amend 
their Complaint, and such was stipulated to by counsel for 
Deseret Federal, the Amended Complaint was not ultimately 
filed and is, therefore, absent from the Record on Appeal. 
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103). In that Plaintiffs, in essence, sought an Order 
enjoining the trustee's sale, testimony and exhibits were 
offered by the parties. Because Plaintiffs' priority claims 
rested largely on a theory of "relation back" to earlier 
work performed on the property, the evidence focused prin-
cipally on the level of activity at the condominium between 
1982 and 1985 and whether it represented a material abandon-
ment of the construction project. (R. 105). Following the 
evidentiary hearing, Judge Cornaby issued his Ruling denying 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Stay the sale and granting this 
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Intervene and Amend its Complaint were granted so long as 
such amendment and intervention did not interfere with 
Deseret Federal's priority rights. (R. 105-106). The 
trustee's sale then took place as scheduled on April 14, 
1987. 
Although Objections and a Motion for Reconsideration 
were filed by Plaintiffs, Judge Cornaby entered his Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the various issues on July 
16, 1987. An appeal was taken from the Order dismissing 
Deseret Federal, but that appeal was rejected by the Supreme 
Court as being from a non-final Order. (R. 165). In order 
to make the issues ripe for review, Plaintiffs proceeded by 
voluntarily dismissing the remaining Defendants. Judge 
Cornaby also awarded Respondent attorney's fees incurred 
while defending this matter in a stipulated sum of 
$2,000.00. The case presently before the Supreme Court 
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seeking review of the Order granting Deseret Federal's 
dismissal ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent Deseret Federal adopts Appellants1 Statement 
of Facts with the following exceptions and additions. 
1. On or about March 4, 1981, then owner of Units 80 
and 81, Maple Hills Development, executed a Multi-Family 
Deed of Trust in favor of Deseret Federal Savings and Loan 
Association encumbering the subject real property. That 
instrument secured repayment of a construction loan of even 
date therewith in the sum of $3,209,200.00. The Trust Deed 
was recorded in the office of the Davis County Recorder on 
March 4, 1981, as Entry No. 587251, in Book 859, at Page 
371, and was therefore of record and imparted construction 
notice to the lien claimants when they performed their work 
on the property in September of 1981. (R. 70 and 71). 
2. Because of delinquencies by Maple Hills Development 
under the Note and Trust Deed, Deseret Federal recorded a 
Notice of Default respecting Units 80 and 81 on November 5, 
1982. As part of the nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings, 
Thomas C. Sturdy, counsel for Deseret Federal, obtained a 
title report which revealed Nu-Trend's lien against the 
property. Nu-Trend was therefore notified of the default 
and the trustee's sale which ultimately took place on March 
14, 1983, at the Davis County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah. 
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(R. 61-63). The lender, Deseret Federal, acquired the 
property at that sale as the sole and successful bidder. 
3. The initial work performed by Nu-Trend on the 
property, from September of 1981 to May of 1982, was at the 
behest of Franklin Johnson. (R. 103). Importantly, however, 
Mr. Johnson had no ownership interest in the property at 
that time. (R. 105). At best f!we had - I had a contract or 
earnest money with Michael Crowley11 (Testimony of Franklin 
Johnson at T. 43). 
A. At all pertinent times between March of 1983 (when 
the Trustee's Sale took place) and June of 1985 (when the 
property was sold to David and Victor Kimball), Deseret 
Federal was the owner of Units 80 and 81. (R. 103-104). 
During that period, no work was performed on the interior of 
the Units. (R. 104 and testimony of Mark Finlinson at T. 
34-36). At best, a sprinkling system was installed, a 
driveway was graded, and some siding was placed on an 
adjoining unit. These were, admittedly, not part of the 
construction plan drafted for Franklin Johnson under which 
Nu-Trend performed electrical work in 1981 and 1982 and 
commencing again in August of 1985. (Testimony of Franklin 
Johnson at 42-43 and 45). (R. 104-105). Although somewhat 
unclear from the Record, it appears the work was performed 
by either the Homeowners1 Association or Deseret Federal, 
the condominium's owner. 
5. After holding the property for over two years, 
Deseret Federal finally sold Units 80 and 81 in June of 1985 
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to David and Victor Kimball, The Association took back a 
purchase money Trust Deed as a result of that transaction, 
which was thereafter duly recorded in the office of the 
Davis County Recorder. The Kimballs1 acquired the condo-
minium on behalf of Franklin Johnson, who thereafter leased 
it with an option to purchase. (T. 41). Plaintiffs/Appel-
lants Nu-Trend, Croft Floors and Bangerter Masonry were 
employed to complete the interior. (R. 116). Although 
Franklin Johnson began occupying the condominium in June of 
1986, he still did not have an ownership interest in the 
Units. (Testimony of Franklin Johnson at T. 41). And, when 
the lien claimants renewed work on the premises in August of 
1985, they had constructive notice of the June 1985 Deseret 
Federal Trust Deed. (R. 105). 
6. The Kimballs failed to make monthly payments when 
due on the purchase money obligation, resulting in 
nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings being instituted by 
Deseret Federal. A Notice of Default and Election to Sell 
under the new Trust Deed covering Units 80 and 81 was 
recorded on December 9, 1986, in the Davis County Recorder's 
Office. When the loan was not reinstated, and upon 
expiration of the 90 day statutory period, the trustee 
noticed up a sale on the property for April 14, 1987. (R. 
50). These foreclosure actions by Deseret Federal prompted 
a flurry of activity on Plaintiff's part, including filing 
of a Motion to Stay the sale. (R. 36). 
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7. Appellants' Statement of Facts respecting the 
recorded mechanic's liens at paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of 
their Brief are unsubstantiated by testimony as to amounts 
owed, nor are the claimants able to direct the Court's 
attention to any portion of the Record thereon. The lien 
instruments speak for themselves, and at no time in the 
course of these proceedings have Plaintiffs/Appellants 
sought a direct judgment as to these amounts against 
Respondent/Defendant Deseret Federal. 
8. In paragraph 12 of its Statement of Facts, Appel-
lants characterize work performed between March of 1983 and 
June of 1985 as being "substantial". This assertion must be 
rejected as both incorrect and, further, as being unsupported 
by the Record. Respondent notes the following contradictory 
findings and/or testimony: 
(a) Judge Cornaby's ruling that "the property 
basically lay dormant for three years and deteriorated 
between the two periods of time". (R. 105). 
(b) Testimony of David Noakes: 
Q: So in other words you don't 
believe there was much work done during 
that interim period? 
A: The work I believe done was more 
for just general maintenance or upkeep. It 
seemed like there was some work on the 
exterior like grating work done in this 
sort of fashion. 
Q: But it wasn't done to finish the. 
improvements on the interior that you had 
done most of your work at, right? 
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A: Right. 
(T. 24 and 25). 
(c) Testimony of Mark Finlinson: 
Q: Between the first time you visited 
the units [May or June of 1983] and the 
last time you visited the units [summer of 
1985], did you notice any construction work 
being done? 
A: No. 
(T. 35). 
Based on the forgoing, the limited work done during this 
dormant period is better described as "general maintenance". 
9. A different objection may be raised as to Appel-
lants1 paragraph 13. Instead of being a "Statement of 
Fact", it is clearly a legal argument having no place in 
this portion of the Brief. It should consequently be 
stricken. 
10. As a result of the Court's Order dismissing 
Deseret Federal from the lien foreclosure action, a 
trustee's sale to foreclose the Kimball loan was conducted 
as to Units 80 and 81 on April 14, 1987. This Respondent 
acquired the property at that time for the sum of 
$171,000.00, as the sole and successful bidder. (R. 220). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
At Point I 
As all parties recognize, the substantive merits of 
this case involve a determination of the relative priorities 
in Units 80 and 81, Maple Hills Condominiums, between 
Deseret Federal, the purchase money lender, and the lien 
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claimants who performed work on the premises. In order for 
Plaintiffs to establish their seniority over Deseret 
Federal's Trust Deed, they admit having to "relate back" to 
work performed some three and one half years earlier. Judge 
Cornaby correctly found the original work too remote to 
support a relation back theory. 
At Point II 
Although raised by Deseret Federal, Judge Cornaby 
failed to rule upon an alleged estoppel, waiver and/or 
laches defense. A number of undisputed facts show that 
certain conduct of Plaintiffs should bar them from claiming 
priority over Deseret Federal's Trust Deed. As a matter of 
law, Respondent was entitled to a dismissal on these grounds 
either independent of, or in addition to, those relied upon 
by the District Judge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I; THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED DESERET 
FEDERAL'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL. 
A. The Appropriate Standard of Review. 
As the above Statement of the Case suggests, this 
Appeal is primarily from an Order dismissing Respondent from 
the lien foreclosure action. However, because the dismissal 
Motion was heard contemporaneous with Plaintiff's Motion to 
Enjoin the Trustee's Sale, oral testimony was presented. 
The evidence naturally pertained to the underlying merits of 
the case and, hence, was considered extensively by the Court 
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in granting Defendant's Motion. It also resulted in the 
Court's entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 
the close of the proceedings. 
Although uncommon and perhaps even superfluous in the 
context of a Dismissal, the Findings in this case are fully 
supported by the Record and contain largely undisputed 
facts. To the small extent they might be disputed by 
Appellants, they are accorded great deference and should not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous. General Glass Corp. 
vs. Mast Construction Co., 758 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1988). In 
our case, they are particularly important in considering the 
issues of: material abandon- ment; whether the work was 
part of a "common plan"; and whether Deseret Federal might 
have had notice of the construction work at the time of 
granting the Kimball loan. All of these elements are key 
factors in resolving the question of whether the liens may 
relate back, for purposes of priority, to earlier work. 
B. Appellants' Liens for Work Performed in 1985 and 
1986 May Not Relate Back to Pre-1983 Trustee's 
Sale Work for Purposes of Priority. 
Appellants readily admit they must rely upon a "relation 
back" theory to support any interest in the property superior 
to Deseret Federal's 1985 Trust Deed. And, in turn, the 
construction work upon which this theory is grounded can 
only be either the limited exterior maintenance performed in 
1984 or that which formed a basis for the 1982 Nu-Trend 
-12-
Mechanic's Lien. Both of these possible scenarios must be 
rejected, as occurred before District Judge Cornaby. 
Throughout this case, Nu-Trend's counsel has informally 
acknowledged that the Maple Hills Development Trust Deed of 
March 1981 in favor of Deseret Federal was of record and, 
hence, senior to the Mechanic's Lien recorded in June of 
1982 for work performed from September of 1981 through May 
of 1982. (T. 48). But, while the claimant admits the lien 
instrument was wiped out by the 1983 trustee's sale, it 
nonetheless argues that the work it represents, at least in 
terms of relation back, survives. This contention is 
without merit. 
A simple reading of the Statute, 38-1-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, tends to support Appellants' 
position. It states "the liens herein provided for shall 
relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of the 
commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground 
for the structure or improvement. . . ." (Emphasis added.) 
But, what the Lien Act does not answer is the question of 
what impact Deseret Federal's 1983 trustee's sale had on 
that earlier work. The better reasoned view is that it 
wiped out not only the liens but the work as well. 
Initially, one must analyze the impact of a foreclosure 
sale on the property. Most important, the sale brings about 
an involuntary transfer of ownership. The new owner and 
subsequent parties acquiring the property would be saddled 
with the burden of a possible tacking of subsequent liens to 
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work performed on behalf of the prior owner who has lost his 
interest through foreclosure. Because the liens are no 
longer of record, but for fear of a possible relation back, 
successor purchasers would be unable to obtain title insur-
ance. Without title insurance, and for fear of losing 
valuable security, financial institutions would not provide 
financing. The real estate market would stagnate and 
substantial impediments to the free transfer of real property 
would arise. These policy considerations should compel the 
Court to disallow any relation back to work performed prior 
to a foreclosure sale such as the one conducted by Deseret 
Federal in 1983 on the Units. 
The 1983 foreclosure also precludes any recovery for 
Nu-Trend's labor or materials going into the Units prior 
thereto. At a minimum, Appellants' claim set forth in the 
June 1983 lien cannot be allowed. Statements at page 5 of 
Appellants' Brief seeking those amounts are contradicted by 
admissions of its counsel made at other stages of this case. 
(T. 48). 
The lien claimants' interpretation of the Statute and 
its relation back portion is also contradicted by numerous 
rulings of the Utah Supreme Court thereon. This authority 
contemplates that, for a relation back to take place, notice 
of the earlier work must be given to others who may claim a 
lien including a lender. Tripp vs. Vaughn, 747 P. 2d 1051 
(Utah App. 1987). There, relying upon Western Mortgage Loan 
Corp. v. Cottonwood Construction Co., 18 Utah 2d 409, 424 
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P.2d 437 (1967), the Court found that the presence of 
building materials upon the property or other visible 
evidence of work must exist in order to provide notice of 
commencement to any interested parties. On our facts, any 
notion of "notice" is unfounded per the testimony of Mark 
Finlinson, who managed Deseret Federal's repossessed proper-
ties during the period in question. Upon his first visit to 
the condominium in September of 1983, no construction was 
noted. (T. 34). This is confirmed by the testimony of 
David Noakes, part owner of Nu-Trend, who represented that 
he ceased work in September of 1982. (T. 17). An addi-
tional factor weighing against any finding of notice to 
Deseret Federal is the fact that the work was performed for 
Franklin Johnson, who had no interest in the property of 
record, and not for the owner Maple Hills Development. 
Other limitations aside from the requirement of "notice" 
have been imposed on the doctrine of relation back to 
protect lenders such as Deseret Federal. 
For one contractor's lien to relate back to 
the commencement of work or supplying of 
materials by another contractor, however, 
both contractor's projects must have been 
performed in connection with what is 
essentially a single project, performed 
under a common plan, prosecuted with 
reasonable promptness and without material 
abandonment. 
Calder Brothers Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982), 
924. Appellants' theory of relation back also fails for 
their inability to satisfy this criteria. 
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In an attempt to show "a common plan", the lien claim-
ants rely exclusively upon the fact that all work was 
performed for Franklin Johnson and pursuant to a single set 
of plans for "the Franklin Johnson residence". See, 
generally, testimony of David Noakes at pp. 19-21. But, 
while the blueprints (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) were admittedly 
used during both periods of construction, the work was done 
under two separate and distinct contracts with different 
general contractors. This is fatal to the relation back 
theory. 
The original contract was with Lucidus Construction, 
whereas the general contractor, when work renewed in 1986, 
was Princeton Brothers Construction. The commonality 
required under Western Mortgage does not permit the tacking 
of two separate construction contracts. Boise Cascade Corp. 
vs. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977). A somewhat exten-
sive quote from Fields vs. Daisy Goldmining Co. is appropri-
ate on this point: 
In general, we consider the proper rule to 
be that, when all the items in the account 
relate to one continuous transaction 
between the same parties, although the 
goods were delivered on separate orders and 
at different dates, within short intervals 
of each other in the dealings of the 
parties indicated in expectation to 
continue such business relations, the 
transactions constitute a continuous 
running account regardless of intervening 
irregular monthly balances in the account, 
which dates from the date of the last item 
delivered and relates back to the time of 
. the first delivery of material under that 
course of dealing or contract shown. . . . 
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If the materials were furnished for 
separate and distinct purposes under 
distinct contracts . . . then there would 
be no presumption of a continuous account, 
and, in the absence of any express 
contract, a right for a lien, if any, would 
date from the time of the commencement to 
furnish materials for the different 
separate contracts on each separate order. 
25 Utah 76, 69 P. 528 (1902). (Emphasis 
added.) 
On our facts, project continuity is also contrary to 
the lengthy interruption of labor on the Unitfs interior. 
2 
Although the mere passage of time is not determinative, 
coupled with two changes of ownership as occurred here, the 
substantial interruption of work defeats Appellants1 argu-
ments . 
For approximately three years, Units 80 and 81 in Maple 
Hills Condominiums lay dormant. Frank Johnson lost whatever 
interest he had in the property by reason of the 1983 
trustee's sale. Johnson clearly abandoned the project, 
particularly in light of his Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. (T. 
44). Describing our facts as being merely a "temporary 
cessation of work11 is a gross understatement. Parties 
weren't paid, owners changed twice, and the primary obligor 
filed bankruptcy. Whatever interest Johnson may have 
expressed in the Units during their 3-year dormancy does not 
rebut the clear weight and inference of all the other 
circumstances. This was more than adequate evidence to 
See, Tri-City Building Center, Inc. v. Wagner, 548 
P.2d 9FT~(0r"e 
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support the Court's finding of a "material abandonment11 of 
the construction job. (R. 117-118). 
c
* Reliance On the Minor Items of Exterior Work 
Performed is Similarly Unpersuasive in Supporting 
a Relation Back. 
Starting with the seminal case of Western Mortgage, 
cited above as 424 P.2d 437, the Utah Supreme Court has 
consistently refused to allow a tacking and relation back in 
a lien priority case to incidental work performed outside 
the confines of the single, continuous project. When, as 
here, the single project is the interior of the Franklin 
Johnson Unit, this rule prohibits reliance on itetms such as 
the sprinkler system, siding and driveway installation. 
This principle is reinforced considering the different 
parties for whom the work was performed, whether it be Frank 
Johnson, Deseret Federal or the Maple Hills Homeowners' 
Association. The Court is particularly sensitive when the 
overall project involves either a condominium or subdivision 
where large quantities of work benefit one portion of the 
development and not others. See e.g., Rotta v. Hawk, 756 
P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988), and First of Denver Mortgage 
Investors v. C. N. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 
1979). 
There also exists a policy against permitting a party, 
to tack his lien upon minor maintenance or clean up items 
such as those performed during the three year period on 
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these premises. Calder Brothers Co, v. Anderson, 652 P.2d 
922. An analogy is also drawn to the "completion of a job" 
under § 38-1-7, Utah Code Annotated, on the recording of a 
mechanic's lien. The time restraints contained in that 
Section may not be extended by performing trivial work after 
the primary construction contract Is completed. Palombi v. 
D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969). 
In general, this case poses the classic question of 
where to draw the line. At some point, the prior work upon 
which the relation back is premised becomes too remote, 
whether in time or substance. Ours is clearly such a case. 
Appellants1 attempt to relate back to work performed three 
and one half years earlier, before Deseret Federal's fore-
closure sale and its subsequent transfer to the Kimballs, is 
strained. So are their efforts to tack on the incidental 
maintenance and exterior work done at the request of Deseret 
Federal or the Homeowners' Association. Simply put, this 
was not part of a "single project prosecuted with reasonable 
promptness and without material abandonment." 
POINT II: PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED FROM SEEKING A LIEN 
FORECLOSURE AGAINST DESERET FEDERAL. 
Assuming, for purposes of argument, that Appellants' 
liens may relate back to the earlier work and thus have 
priority over Deseret Federal's Trust Deed, they are, 
3 
Nu-Trend's own witness, David Noakes, admitted this 
was only general maintenance or upkeep type work performed 
during the interim period. (T. 24-25). 
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nonetheless, barred from asserting those claims by reason of 
their conduct in failing to bid at the 1983 Deseret Federal 
trustee's sale, record a lis pendens against the Units and 
prosecute this case with reasonable diligence. 
At no time in this litigation has Nu-Trend claimed 
priority over the original Deseret Federal loan and Trust 
Deed to Maple Hills Development. Indeed, as stated above, 
Appellants' counsel has acknowledged that its lien is 
junior, subject and inferior to the underlying development 
loan. Yet, with full notice of the 1983 foreclosure 
proceedings, Nu-Trend failed to take any action to protect 
their interest. This conduct should be construed as a 
waiver of the lien and an independent ground for upholding 
the dismissal of Deseret Federal. 
In Mull vs. Alaska Federal Savings and Loan of Juneau, 
658 P. 2d 122 (Alaska 1983), a Trust Deed holder repeatedly 
gave a junior interest claimant notice of the pending 
foreclosure sale. The Court found that the junior 
claimant's inaction respecting the sale constituted an 
estoppel, barring them from objecting to a loss of their 
interest. Of similar import is the Utah case of Bennion vs. 
Amoss, 530 P.2d 810 (Utah 1975). There it was found that 
acquiescence in a foreclosure sale estopped a party from 
complaining of any defects therein. See also, Coombs vs. 
Ouzounian, 24 Utah 2d 39, 465 P.2d 356 (1970). Under these 
cases, Nu-Trend was compelled to either bid and purchase the 
property at the sale or seek an injunction to stop it. 
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More disturbing than Nu-Trendfs failure to act on the 
1983 foreclosure sale is its failure to move forward in the 
pending litigation. Between December of 1982 and March of 
1987, the case languished on the District Court's Inactive 
Calendar. Plaintiffs would have this conduct excused due to 
the automatic stay accompanying the Franklin Johnson Chapter 
11 bankruptcy. And yet, now they have voluntarily dismissed 
Johnson from the lawsuit, despite his primary liability on 
the debt. Nu-Trend should not now be able to fall back on 
the bankruptcy to justify its lack of diligence. See 
generally, Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. 
Larson Contractor, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). 
Unfortunately, this inaction, accompanied by a failure 
to record a Lis Pendens upon instituting the lien 
foreclosure action, greatly prejudiced Deseret Federal. 
Fully cognizant that the 1983 foreclosure sale wiped out the 
Nu-Trend lien, and without a Lis Pendens to impart notice, 
in 1985 Deseret Federal proceeded with a sale of the Units 
to David and Victor Kimball, taking back a Trust Deed to 
secure payment of the purchase price. Although speculative, 
this transaction would likely have not occurred had a Lis 
Pendens been of record or litigation actively pursued. 
Deseret Federal reasonably relied upon the dormant state of 
affairs, to its detriment. Appellants should now be barred 
by this conduct from asserting their claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the decision of Judge 
Cornaby granting Deseret Federal's Motion to Dismiss should 
be affirmed. The District Court correctly found Deseret 
Federal's Trust Deed to be superior to the interests of the 
lien claimants in the subject property. The relation back 
sought by Appellants requires the Court to far extend that 
doctrine and allow remote and distant work to be covered. 
Any such expansion is unwarranted by the facts in this case. 
Assuming application of the relation back theory, 
Plaintiffs are, nonetheless, barred from asserting their 
claims due to a failure to record a Lis Pendens, prosecute 
this case with due diligence and/or protect their interests 
in the property at the trustee's sale. 
Finally, and upon affirmation of the District Court's 
Ruling, Respondent Deseret Federal requests an award of its 
attorney's fees incurred in the course of this appeal and a 
remand to the District Court to assess the amount thereof. 
Respectfully submitted this day of , 
1988. 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
By
 rr_^_w_T_r9 
Michael A. Katz 
By 
Joseph E. Hatch 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
NU-TREND ELECTRIC, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
LUCIDUS CONSTRUCTION, et al., 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 32711 . , 
The above matter having come on as scheduled for 
hearing before the Court on April 8, 1987, on Plaintiff 
Nu-Trend Electricfs Motion for an injunction restraining a 
trustee's sale of the subject property and to amend its 
Complaint herein, Croft Flooring's Motion to Intervene, and 
Defendant Deseret Federal's Motion to Dismiss; Plaintiff 
Nu-Trend and Defendant Croft Flooring appearing by and 
through their counsel, Neil B. Crist, and Defendant Deseret 
Federal appearing and represented by counsel, Michael A. 
Katz; the Court having heard the testimony of witnesses and 
arguments of counsel, having read and considered the 
Memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court now makes the 
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
I I Z~.l " , ._ _ 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about March 4, 1981, Deseret Federal Savings 
and Loan Association duly recorded a Deed of Trust: executed 
by Maple Hills Development, Inc., against Units 80 and 81 of 
the Maple Hills condominium complex. Said Trust Deed 
secured repayment of a construction loan of even date 
therewith in the principal sum of $3,209,200.00. 
2. Between September 14, 1981, and May 28, 1982, 
Plaintiff Nu-Trend Electric performed construction work on 
said units, which work is represented by a Mechanic's Lien 
recorded June 28, 1982. 
3. Said work was performed pursuant to a construction 
contract between Nu-Trend and Lucidus Construction, the 
general contractor on the project. Franklin Johnson had 
requested the work. 
4. Nu-Trend brought this action to foreclose its 
Mechanic's Lien on or about September 28, 1982. 
5. On or about March 14, 1983, Deseret Federal 
conducted a trustee's sale under the above-referenced Trust 
Deed as a result of the default of Maple Hills Development. 
Deseret Federal purchased the two units at that sale as the 
sole and successful bidder. 
6. Both original and subsequent work was in accord 
with architectural plans prepared for the "Frank Johnson 
Residence". Mr. Johnson contracted for the construction 
work but filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1982. 
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V. On or about June 6, 1985, Deseret Federal sold the 
subject property to David and Victor Kimball. Repayment of 
the purchase price was secured by a Trust Deed executed in 
favor of Deseret Federal by the Kimballs, which Trust Deed 
was duly acknowledged and subsequently recorded in the Davis 
County Recorder's office. 
8. After the sale by Deseret Federal to the Kimball, 
Franklin Johnson obtained a lease with an option to purchase 
the units from the owners. Thereafter, Frank Johnson hired 
Princeton Construction to improve the interior of the units. 
Nu-Trend was once again hired and did perform electrical 
work in the interior of the units, with Croft Flooring also 
providing services and materials. 
9. Although the Homeowner's Association performed 
some work on or around the exterior of Units 80 and 81, 
which consisted of grading, installation of a sprinkler 
system, cement work and siding, no work was performed on the 
interior between March 14, 1983, and June 13, 1985. 
10. Neither Nu-Trend Electric nor Croft have been 
fully paid for their work and, consequently, those parties 
have recorded liens in the Office of the Davis County 
Recorder subsequent to the Deseret Federal Trust Deed. 
11. By reason of a default on the part of the 
Kimballs, Deseret Federal has scheduled a trustee's sale 
with respect to Units 80 and 81, Maple Hills Condominiums, 
for April 14, 1987. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. By reason of the March 4, 1981, Trust Deed against 
Units 80 and 81, Deseret Federal had a valid, senior and 
prior lien over the Mechanic's Lien recorded by Nu-Trend 
Electric on or about June 28, 1982. As a result, the 
trustee's sale conducted by Deseret Federal in March of 1983 
extinguished Plaintiff's claim against the subject property. 
2. The purchase money Trust Deed taken back by 
Deseret Federal from a sale of the units to the Kiraballs, 
which Trust Deed was recorded on June 13, 1985, is a valid, 
senior and prior lien against the property over that of 
liens recorded by Croft Flooring and Nu-Trend Electric, 
representing new and additional construction work on the 
units commenced in August of 1985. 
3. As a result of the following, the liens of Croft 
and Nu-Trend may not relate back to construction work 
performed in 1981 and 1982 in order to assert priority o^ rer 
the Deseret Federal Trust Deed: 
(a) That different general contractors were hired 
on the two respective projects (to-wit: Lucidus 
Industries in 1981 and 1982, and Princeton Brothers in 
1985 and 1986). 
(b) There was a trustee's sale on the properties 
between the first work period and the second. 
(c) The property lay dormant with construction 
work being materially abandoned with respect thereto 
for three years. Further, the Court notes that Frank 
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Johnson, the party who contracted for the subject work, 
did not claim an ownership interest therein during 
those periods of time. 
4. By reason of the priority of its Trust Deeds, as 
against the liens of Nu-Trend Electric and Croft Flooring, 
Deseret Federal is entitled to be dismissed with prejudice 
from this action. 
5. Plaintiff Nu-Trend Electric is entitled to file an 
Amended Complaint to reflect the foregoing facts so long as 
such amendment does not interfere with Deseret Federal's 
priority lien rights. 
6. Croft Flooring is entitled to intervene as a 
Plaintiff in this action so long as it does not interfere 
with Deseret Federal's priority lien rights. 
7. Pursuant to the Court's finding that the lien of 
Deseret Federal is senior and prior to those of Nu-Trend 
Electric and Croft Flooring, Plaintiff's Motion to enjoin 
the trustee's sale is denied. Deseret Federal may proceed 
with the sale currently scheduled for April 14, 1987. 
DATED this /£ day of April, 1987. 
N. D0UGLAS CORNABY 
^DISTRICT JUDGE 
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